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Evaluating Direct Democracy: A Response,
t
MATTHEW L. SPITZER

Professors Marci Hamilton and Elizabeth Garrett address different quesions about how to deal with direct democracy.1 Professor Hamilton asks
whether direct democracy is a good idea, and concludes that "the tide of
direct democracy should be stemmed." Professor Garrett focusses a bit more
narrowly, arguing that direct democracy is influenced and shaped by the same
interest groups that shape legislation. She also considers how a court should
approach interpreting directly enacted legislation.
Although Professor Hamilton's result-direct democracy "should be
stemmed"-may be correct, her methodology is not. Professor Hamilton argues
that the framers of the U.S. Constitution set up a system designed to avoid
tyranny by decentralizing power. The framers spread power between Congress,
President, and Courts; between state and federal governments; between church
and state; and between authors and publishers. The framers believed that
spreading power among various social organs would naturally check power,
and mob rule-otherwise known as the "tyranny of the majority"-would be
defeated. Professor Hamilton invokes the images of a clock and of a solar
system to animate these ideas, but I think they are not much different from
the conceptions usually referred to as "checks and balances." The net result of
all of these checks and balances should include, at least, a slow, deliberate,
status quo-oriented government. Within this framework, legislators become
trustees, charged with weighing and balancing various aspects of the public
good when deciding how to vote on legislation and do other legislative tasks.
In contrast, according to Professor Hamilton, a voter in a booth need merely
ask "what's in it for me?" Because direct democracy thus represents such a
wide departure from the framers' plan for our federal and state governments,
it should be abandoned.
t. Matthew L.Spitzer is Professor of Law and Social Science at California Institute
of Technology, and William T. Dalessi Professor of Law at the University of Southern
California. He owes thanks to Mike Alvarez, Elisabeth Gerber, Jonathan Katz, Skip Lupia
and John Matsusaka for conversations, to Elizabeth Garrett for reading a draft, and to
Kevin Roosevelt and Cathy Zeiler for research assistance.
1. See Marci A. Hamilton, The People: The Least Accountable Branch, 4 U Chi L
Sch Roundtable 1 (1997); and Elizabeth Garrett, Who Directs Direct Denocracy?, 4 U
'ill
Chi L Sch Roundtable 17 (1997).
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Professor Hamilton's methodology fails because she compares two different
things. She contrasts the aspirational vision of democratic government as
framed by our Constitution with the real politics of voters in booths. If one
were to invoke the aspirational vision of direct democracy, it would include
actively interested citizen voters, informing themselves of the arguments about
ballot propositions, engaging in spirited debates, and coming to well-reasoned
decisions about how to vote prior to entering the voting booth. The long
period of time between qualifying an initiative for the ballot would allow for
a full reflective equilibrium, both on the level of the individual voter and
within interest groups. The result of the vote should thus define the public's
vision on the subject of the initiative.
Although comparing the aspirational ideal of representative government
with the analogous ideal for direct democracy might illuminate the relative
merits of the ideal conceptions, and might also represent a starting point for
evaluating direct democracy, it does little to help us choose whether to value
existing forms of direct democracy.
I contend that evaluating direct democracy requires at least comparing the
available theory and evidence on the actual operation of representative legislation with the theory and evidence on the actual operation of direct democracy.
Such theory and evidence will naturally bear on both the process and outcomes of legislation and direct democracy.
In short, I agree with Professor Garrett when she writes:
[M]erely analyzing the shortcomings of direct democracy does not answer
the question of whether this form of lawmaking is desirable. To fully
evaluate popular lawmaking, we must compare it with the alternative-governance by elected representatives. Moreover, our comparison
must focus on the reality of the state and federal legislative processes,
rather than on some idealized conception of representative democracy in
which the legislature comprised men and women replete with wisdom
and civic virtue who rise above current passions to pursue the public
interest.2
The purpose of my small contribution is to emphasize the nature of some of
the comparisons that must be made, and to introduce a bit of the learning
from political science into the evaluation. I will start by giving a thumbnail
sketch of what is known about representative legislation, and then do the same
for direct democracy.

2. Elizabeth Garrett, 4 U Chi L Sch Roundtable at 24 (1997) (cited in note 1).
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I. Legislation
A. PRoCEss
The process of organizing and running a modem legislature is far from the
ideal that the framers might have embraced. Modem legislatures organize
themselves into committees that exercise effective veto power over legislation in
their area. Because the committees are stacked with members whose districts
have special interests in the committee's subject matte; the committee will often
preserve a status quo that deviates substantially from the preferences of a
substantial majority of the legislators. Thus, agriculture committees may protect
subsidies to inefficient farms, a commerce committee may protect airlines from
competition, and a committee on taxation may protect special tax breaks for
particular industries.
When bills are allowed through the relevant committees and onto the floor
for a vote, the legislators seldom read the bill before voting on it. Instead, if dhe
legislators read anything, it is the summary of the bill prepared by the relevant
committee. More often, howeve; the legislators do not even read the summary.
Instead, the summary is read and digested by one of the legislator's staff, who
tells the legislator what to do. Furthe; the advice is not what a naive observer
might expect. If the bill is on a subject that the legislator's constituents care
about, or can be made to care about at the next election by a hostile challenger
then the legislator must "vote his district." If the bill is on a subject that the
legislator's constituents do not care about, then the legislator will look for
another legislator with whom to trade the vote so as to gain a favorable outcome
on another bill that the constituents care about. If no trade can be worked out,
the legislator has nothing left to do but vote his vision of the public interest.
There are good theoretical reasons for expecting reelection-minded legislators
to act in this fashion. If legislators want to get reelected they must budget their
time and resources carefully. Funds must be raised, constituents must be helped
individually (by doing "casework"), and legislative business must be conducted.
Reading complex bills before voting costs a lot; reading would take a great deal
of time from other tasks, particularly raising funds for reelection campaigns. On
the other hand, staffers can be trusted to give accurate summaries of the bills, or
at least of the committee summary of the bill. Hence, the legislator's marginal
benefit from reading the bill is small. In sum, a rational legislator would not be
expected to read most of the bills on which she votes.
Even if a legislator were inclined to read the text of a bill, often she would
be unable to do so. In many cases the text of a bill or an amendment is not
available early enough to allow a careful read. Relying on committee or party
summaries is thus the only course of action, given time constraints.
Rational legislators should organize themselves into committees. The rational
legislator gains a reelection advantage by trading a small amount of influence
over all policy areas for a larger amount of influence over a policy area about
which the legislator's constituents care deeply. Because voters in different districts
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care deeply about different things, legislators can organize themselves into
subject-based committees and make (almost) all legislators better off. Committees
have another advantage. Committee members can learn a lot about some
complex issues and be much better able to control the specialized bureaucracies
that provide services to the public.
Rational, reelection-minded legislators should be expected to vote in much
the same way that they seem to vote. If such a legislator were to vote against her
district, she would be subject to a challenge at the next election that focussed on
the vote. If no such challenge can be mounted, a rational legislator would look
for a way to "spend" the vote on something she cares about--either reelection
(by trading the vote) or true beliefs about the public interest (by casting the vote
honestly).'
B. SUBSTANCE

Characterizing legislative output is, ;,i some ways, more controversial than
describing legislative process. Much legislation i obviously the result of bargains
and logrolls, and hence represents the interests of diverse groups. Some of the
legislation, often called pork barrel, seems to serve the interests of a very narrow,
geographically concentrated group. And some of it seems to approximate a more
or less defensible vision of the public interest.
There are reasons to believe that legislative output should deviate from the
preferences of the polity's median voter. First, the organization of the legislature
described above should affect outcomes. The committee system, when run by
legislators whose preferences differ from those of the median voter, should bias
outcomes.4 In addition, the voting institutions, including the informal institution
of vote trading, as well as the formal institutions of agenda control, either by a
speaker or a rules committee or something similar, should also bias outcomes
away from the median.' Last, constituents and representatives have incomplete
information about each other's preferences. This may give rise to "shirking"
behavior on the part of legislators (because of voters' incomplete information)6
3. See Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic
Theory of Politics, 74 American Economic Review 279 (1984); Joseph P. Kalt and Mark
A. Zupan, The Apparent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing for Principal-Agent
Slack in Political Institutions, 33 Journal of Law and Economics 103 (1990).
4. See Barry R. Weingast and William J. Marshall, The Industrial Organization of
Congress: or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 Journal
of Political Economy 132, 14849 (1988); Barry R. Weingast, Kenneth A. Shepsle, and
Christopher Johnson, The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Ap-

proach to Distributive Politics, 89 Journal of Political Economy 642, 644-45 (1981). See
generally Thomas Gilligan and Keith Krehbiel, Collective Decision-Making and Standing
Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures, 3 Journal
of Law, Economics, & Organization 287 (1987).

5. See, for example, Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33 Public Choice 27, 40 (1978).

6. Kalt and Zupan, 74 American Economic Review at 297 (cited in note 3); Kalt and
Zupan, 33 Journal of Law and Economics at 105 (cited in note 3).
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and mistakes and biased decisions by legislators (because of legislators' incomplete information).7
II. Direct Democracy
A. PRoCEss
As Professor Garrett details so well, the process of direct democracy falls
well short of any ideal method of social choice. The initiatives are often long,
complex, and written in dense language. Then, there is a long and expengive
process of qualifying the initiative for the ballot. Professional consultants often
direct the signature drive, and signature gatherers are directed (or incentivizid)
to avoid deep deliberative conversations with potential petition signers. Once an
initiative has qualified for the ballot, an expensive campaign will likely be needed
to convince voters to approve the initiative. An expensive campaign against the
initiative may also be waged, and "killer" alternative initiatives may also be
proposed.' At election time many voters seem to have little information about
the initiative proposals on which they are voting.
I wish to make only two points. First, when we speak of a system of "direct
democracy," we are actually talking about a mixed system of representation and
direct democracy.9 The process of direct democracy that we have just described
focusses only on the initiative portion. The description of the legislative process
that I provided above was taken primarily from studies of the United States
Congress, along with a few studies of state legislatures. No one, to my knowledge, has checked to see if state legislative processes change in some important
way when the initiative process is introduced into a state. If the legislative process were to change in response to direct democracy, this might well be important to the evaluation of direct democracy.
Second, political scientists are making some headway in understanding the
circumstances in which voters can acquire sufficient information to make
informed political choices. "Informed," in this context, does not mean that the
voter can describe in detail the social costs and benefits associated with particular choices. Instead, the question is whether voters can learn enough to cast votes
that are the same ones they would have cast had they had significant cost/benefit
knowledge."0 As Professor Garrett points out, citizens often try to deal with
7. John G. Matsusaka, Economics of Direct Legislation, 107 Quarterly Journal of
Economics 541, 542-49 (1992).
8. On the difficulty of studying the role of interest groups in this process, see
Elisabeth R. Gerber, The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence and the Promise of
Direct Legislation, University of California, San Diego, Department of Political Science
Working Paper (Feb 1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Roundtable).
9. There are at least two senses in which we have mixed systems of direct democracy
and legislative democracy. Sometimes the mix is formally explicit, as when referenda put
statutes up for popular vote or initiatives place items on the legislative agenda. Sometimes

the mix is implicit; there are alternative routes-through the legislature or through direct
democracy-to pass a statute. The text discusses the latter sense of mixed systems.
10. The most thorough exploration of this topic to date appears to be Arthur Lupia
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their lack of cost/benefit knowledge by searching for cues about how to vote.
And the two cheapest cues in legislative elections, party identification and
incumbency, are lacking in initiative contests. Perhaps one should conclude that
the voters cannot learn enough to vote as if they had cost/benefit information.
This pessimism may be premature. In Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias,"

Arthur Lupia showed that voters in a California election choosing between
alternative insurance "reform" initiatives could be grouped into three sets: voters
with cost/benefit information, voters lacking costs/benefit information but who
had figured out what the insurance industry's positions were; and those who
lacked cost/benefit and insurance industry position information. Voters who had
learned cost/benefit information and those who lacked cost/benefit information
but who knew of the insurance industry's position voted almost identically.
Voters who lacked both sorts of information, however, voted very differently.
Thus, Lupia concluded, it was possible for some voters to find a cue that worked
as well (in terms of voting) as acquiring cost/benefit knowledge.
Other work by Arthur Lupia, 12 as well as work by Elisabeth Gerber, 3 tells
a similar story-rationally ignorant voters are pretty good at finding cues to help
them vote their interests. In fact, if we compare voters' ability to choose policies

by voting for legislators, as opposed to the voters' ability to choose policies directly, direct democracy has some advantages. When voting for a candidate a
voter must often guess at the candidate's position on issues, must take the risk
that the candidate will change his mind on an issue, must hope that the voter's
own preference does not change by the time the issue is to be decided, must deal
with the candidate's positions on a bundle of issues, and so forth. 4 In contrast,

and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They
Need to Know? (Cambridge University Press) (forthcoming). Lupia and McCubbins argue
that citizens can learn from others when the others are both knowledgeable and have incentives to tell the truth. Lupia and McCubbins also argue that political institutions can
be designed to foster these conditions. Professor Garrett argues that we should prefer
direct democracy or pure representation on the basis of "how to structure each to allow
space for reasoned decisionmaking," and that "[d]irect democracy can also be structured
in a variety of ways to facilitate public discussion." See Garrett, 4 U Chi L Sch
Roundtable at 26-27 (cited in note 1). This seems quite consistent with Lupia and
McCubbins' agenda.
11. Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in
California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 American Political Science Review 63, 72
(March 1994).
12. See Arthur Lupia, Who Can Persuade Whom?: How Simple Cues Affect Political
Attitudes, University of California, San Diego, Working Paper (May 1997) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the Roundtable).
13. See Elisabeth R. Gerber and Arthur Lupia, Voter Competence in Direct Legislation
Elections, in Steven L. Elkin and Carol E. Soltar, eds, Democracy and Citizen Competence
(Penn State) (forthcoming); and Elisabeth R. Gerber, The Populist Paradox: Interest Group
Influence and the Promise of Direct Legislation, University of California, San Diego,
Department of Political Science Working Paper (Feb 1997) (unpublished manuscript on file
with the Roundtable).
14. Gerber and Lupia, Voter Competence at 15-17 (cited in note 13).
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when voting on an initiative, a voter faces a quite different and possibly less
severe set of problems.
B. SUBSTANCE
There are theoretical reasons to believe that adding direct democracy to a
representative system of government may change the laws. Recall that there are
both theoretical reasons and empirical evidence supporting the belief that a
purely representative government will adopt laws that deviate significantly from
the preferences of the median voter. A just-emerging set of work in political
science suggests that adding an initiative process will pull laws back toward the
preferences of the median voter." And in states with initiatives, the legislature
will tend to revert to passing uncontroversial "good government" laws, leaving
the controversial laws with substantial distributive effects to the initiative
process."
The basic idea is as follows. Consider the problem of a legislator trying to
choose a policy when an interest group can, at some cost, propose an initiative
after the legislator has chosen a policy. If the legislator chooses a policy too far
away from the preferences of the median voter, an interest group will intervene
and propose an initiative closer to the preferences of the median voter, and the
initiative will defeat the legislator's policy at the polls. To forestall such an
outcome, the legislator proposes a policy closer to the median voter's preferences.
The interest group is deterred from proposing the initiative. Where the legislator
makes an error, the interest group is not deterred, proposes an initiative, and the
17
law moves closer to the median voter
Note that there are two results here. First, the behavior of the legislature
changes in response to the threat of the initiative. The legislature, working in the
shadow of the initiative process, chooses outcomes that are closer to the median
voter and refuses to vote on really controversial distributive issues. Second, the
initiative is used to bring some laws into line with the preferences of the median
voter.
Existing theory has a lot of room for improvement. First, the models assume
the existence of an interest group with a preference. Although this may be fine
for some issues and groups, such as gun control and the NRA, for other issues
the interest group will form in response to voters' perceptions that state law is
far from the median. Thus, the interest group and its preferred policies should be
15. See Matsusaka, 107 Quarterly Journal of Economics 541 (cited in note 7);
Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Response to the Threat of PopularInitiatives, 40 American
Journal of Political Science 99 (1996); and John G. Matsusaka and Nolan M. McCarty,
Political Resource Allocation: The Benefits and Costs of Voter Initiatives, Working Paper
4 (May 19, 1997) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Roundtable).
16. Matsusaka and McCarty, Political Resource Allocation at 21 (cited in note 15).
17. Id at 16, suggesting that if there is only one interest group and it has extreme
views, and if the legislators are uncertain about voters' preferences, the law may be more
extreme with an initiative than without. It is unclear to me that this result survives if
there is more than one interest group.
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made endogenous. Second, existing models assume that voters can observe the
policy content of an initiative. This runs counter both to survey results, as well
as to the existence of the third group of voters-those with neither costlbenefit
information nor interest group information-in Lupia's study.'" New models
should incorporate some voter uncertainty.
The evidence, though generally suggesting that the theory is right, is not
unanimous. John Matsusaka, in two important papers, has presented strong
evidence that legislatures in states with initiatives tend to leave the controversial
distributive issues to the initiative process, 9 and that state budgets are lower
and closer to the preferences of the median voter in states with the initiative."
Elisabeth Gerber, in a very clever study of state abortion laws, has shown that
parental consent laws passed by legislatures in states with the initiative were
closer to the preferences of the median voter than were parental consent laws in
other states.2 Other articles fail to find an effect, though there is reason to
believe that some of them have serious methodological problems.22
Professor Garrett spends the second half of her paper worrying about
judicial interpretation of initiatives, and she is right to do so for at least two
reasons. First, the question of how to interpret these things is interesting,
challenging, and important in its own right. Initiatives are often lengthy, poorly
drafted, and contain seemingly quixotic portions that may represent errors of
drafting or of logic. Judges have developed a set of guides for legislative statutory
interpretation that do not fit initiatives. New guidelines must be developed.
Second, we must know how interest groups, legislators, and voters expect
initiatives to be interpreted by the courts before we can analyze the strategic

18. See Lupia, 88 American Political Science Review 63 (cited in note 11).
19. Matsusaka, 107 Quarterly Journal of Economics at 569 (cited in note 7).
20. John G. Matsusaka, Fiscal Effects of the Voter Initiative: Evidence from the Last
30 Years, 103 Journal of Political Economy 587, 590 (1995) ("[S]tates with the initiative
have significantly lower spending per capita. For a typical initiative state with relatively
easy ballot access, expenditure is about 4 percent less than in a similar state with a pure
representation form of government.").
21. Elisabeth R. Gerber, Legislative Response to the Threat of Popular Initiatives, 40
American Journal of Political Science 99, 124 (Feb 1996). Also see Barbara S. Gamble,
Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 American Journal of Political Science 245
(1997), which finds that the initiative process tends to produce more rights-restrictive laws
than does a purely representative system. Because representative democracies are constructed to bias outcomes in favor of individual rights, Gamble's results support the theory
about the effect of the initiative. Unfortunately, her paper is written in such tones of
moral outrage that it is possible to miss the important intellectual result.
22. See Edward L. Lasher, Jr., Michael G. Hagen, and Steven A. Rochlin, Gun Bebind
the Door? Ballot Initiatives, State Policies and Public Opinion, 58 Journal of Politics 760
(1996) (finding no evidence that initiatives make a "more responsive" policy, but using a
very indirect measure of voter preferences by building on past work aggregating surveys
of public opinion over several years); Paul G. Farnham, The Impact of Citizen Influence

on Local Government Expenditure, 64 Public Choice 201, 211 (1991) (same); Jeffrey S.
Zax, Initiatives and Government Expenditures, 63 Public Choice 267 (1989) (finding that
state expenditures are greater in initiative states).
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behavior surrounding initiatives and legislation. After all, if interest groups
cannot predict how judges will interpret an initiative, the groups will have
trouble taking a position, and voters will be unable to vote appropriately. In
short, if judges and interest groups are clueless, voters may be cueless.
C. INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND PROCESS IN DIEcr DEMOCRACY.
There may well be interactions between the findings about process and the
findings about substance. Consider how the existence of direct democracy in a
state may affect the incentives for voters to gather information. If Gerber, Lupia,
and Matsusaka are correct in asserting that a state with direct democracy is more
likely to have laws that are close to the preferences of the median voter than is
a state without direct democracy, and if voters know that this is true, then
rational voters in direct democracy states will behave differently than voters in
states without direct democracy. Consider a voter in a direct democracy state
who is considering spending time and money to acquire information about
candidates for state office. Such a voter knows that the legislature's actions will
be pushed toward the preferences of the median voter by the threat of an
initiative, and that in case the legislature strays "too far," an initiative will be
proposed. Hence, a rational voter might spend little time and money at the time
of voting for state legislators investigating the candidate's politics on particular
issues. In contrast, a voter in a state without direct democracy knows that there
will be no initiative to change the legislature's choices. Hence, information about
the candidate at the time of election is likely to be worth more to the voter in a
state without direct democracy; the election is the last time that the voter gets to
choose legal output.
Several hypotheses might well flow from this observation.
(1) Inexpensive sources of information about candidates-incumbency, party
endorsement, and notoriety from previous media employment (such as talk show
host or news commentator) will be comparatively more important in states with
direct democracy. Voters can use these cues at virtually no cost, and will resist
spending large amounts of time and effort to learn details that compete with
cheap cues. In particular, this should lead to a stronger incumbency effect in
states with direct democracy.
(2) Abstentions on state legislative races should be higher in states with
direct democracy. Once a voter has stepped into the booth to vote, the marginal
cost of abstaining on a state assemblyman or state senator is lower, for the voter
can count on direct democracy to discipline the process, regardless of who is
elected.
(3) The average distance in policy space between the ideal points of legislators and those of voters should be larger in direct democracy states than in states
without direct democracy.
(4) If hypothesis (1) is correct, and direct democracy exacerbates the incumbency effect, and if the demand for term limits is directly related to the strength
of incumbency in a given state, then the demand for term limits should be higher
in a state with direct democracy.
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III. Pulling It All Together
How should we compare pure representation with direct democracy? This
depends not only upon some of the positive issues that have yet to be resolved-the role of multiple interest groups, the role of some voters' failure to
gain appropriate voting cues, the change in legislative process from initiatives,
and so forth-but also upon the normative evaluation of these phenomena. An
example shows the importance of normative analysis. Suppose that after further
work we conclude that the initiative pulls legislative outcomes toward the
preferences of the median voter. Is this good? It depends, I claim, on which issue
we are examining. If we are talking about the general level of state spending or
of state indebtedness, this may well be a good thing. But if we are talking about
fundamental civil rights, such as freedom of speech, religion, or association,
catering to the median voter may not be such a good idea. In the area of civil
rights many people (including me) think that the appropriate outcome is to allow
more individual freedom than the median voter might like to allow his fellow
citizens. Hence, pulling outcomes toward the preferences of the median voter is
morally ambiguous, and may depend on the type of policy that is being dragged
toward the center.
Academic scholarship usually follows empirical events. The increasing
importance of direct democracy in California and some other states suggests that
a wave of work should soon be coming our way. I hope that my comment on
Professors Hamilton and Garrett provides some help to those who will be
studying direct democracy.

